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ABSTRACT

Research in several domains has shown that the implementation of computerized
decision support aids is often associated with issues of human-automation interaction,
which can have disastrous consequences. One often-cited reason for these issues is the
poor quality of the feedback that is provided to the operators through these tools. The
objective of the proposed investigation is to examine how providing feedback through a
decision support tool affects operator knowledge and performance in the context of a
fault management task for naval gunfire support.
A one-way between-groups comparison was made to investigate differences
between providing decision support feedback (logic trace, mission impact, both, no
feedback) in a fault management task. Logic trace feedback was posited to provide users
with a representation of the logic that the decision support tool used in reaching a
conclusion about the best course of action to perform and is posited to support better
diagnostic performance. Mission impact feedback was posited to provide the operator
with a description of the potential effects that a taking a course of action will have on the
pre-planned mission and is expected to support better prognoses of the outcome of a
particular fault. Finally, providing both feedback types was posited to support better
compensatory actions for fault situations. Results indicated that decision support
feedback has potential improve diagnosis and decrease errors of commission in these
tasks.
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INTRODUCTION

Background

The United States Navy has recently established the ambitious goal of reducing
manning on future Navy ships by as much as 75%. However, while the number of
individuals aboard ships will certainly be smaller, naval warfare will only become more
complex. For example, a new class of naval destroyers with a substantial reduction in
manning levels will have the capability to perform land attack missions, a capability that
was not required of previous destroyer classes. As a result, the operators aboard these
new vessels, who already routinely operate under high workload, will be asked to
perform more tasks than had previously been performed. One potential way of achieving
these seemingly conflicting goals of reduced manning in a more complex domain is to
increase the use of automated systems and decision support tools. However, a substantial
body of research suggests that there are inherent pitfalls with the introduction of
automation and decision support, primarily related to the interaction between the human
and the automated system (Wiener & Curry, 1980; Wiener, 1989; Woods, 1996; Mouloua
& Koonce, 1997). Parasuraman and Riley (1997) posit that, although automated systems
do have potential to support reductions in cognitive and manual workload for operators,
multiple factors influence the effectiveness of the interaction between the operator and

1

the automated system. In fact, the added complexity and changing role of the operator in
many automated systems actually may, in fact, have the opposite of the intended
consequence of workload reduction on the operator (Sheridan, 1970). Lee and Moray
(1996) hypothesize that a complex interaction between factors including operator selfconfidence, system accuracy (see Muir, 1987), perceived workload, and task complexity,
and operator skill level influence operator reliance on automation. Parasuraman et al.
(1997) submit that designers of these systems must consider the consequences on the
human operator is a critical factor in the design of these systems and that among the risks
of not making these considerations (abuse) are over-reliance (misuse), under-reliance
(disuse). Consequently, it is crucial that we understand how to implement these systems
such that they provide operators with the required knowledge to use them effectively.
The interaction between automation and decision support tools and the operator
who utilizes them hinges primarily on the communication strategy that the designers of
these tools implements. In fact, a frequently-cited reason in the literature for humanautomation interaction failures is that the quality of the feedback that is provided to the
operator is often very poor (Norman, 1990; Sarter & Woods, 1992; Mosier & Skitka,
1996; Woods, 1996). The objective of the proposed investigation is to examine how
providing feedback through a decision support tool may affect operator knowledge and
performance. More specifically, this investigation focuses on methods of tailoring
feedback from a decision support tool to the informational needs of operators at various
stages in the decision-making process. For reasons discussed in more detail in following
sections, this investigation was performed within the context of a military fault
management decision-making domain, naval gunfire support, in which operators must
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respond quickly and accurately when there are mechanical faults within gun systems in
an effort to minimize their impact on a pre-planned land attack mission.
Any approach to providing decision support should be rooted in an understanding
of how decision-makers process information within a domain. The following section
provides an integrated framework of human information processing for fault management
tasks and proposes a comparison, based on this framework, between three forms of
feedback that can be provided by a decision support tool for fault resolution.

Information Processing in Fault Management

Rasmussen’s (1986) ‘decision ladder’ (Figure 1) provides a useful framework
from which to describe the information processing activities involved in fault
management. The decision ladder describes human information processing in response to
information from the environment. As the figure illustrates, human behavior can be
represented as a three level hierarchy. At the lowest level of the hierarchy is skill-based
behavior, which is characterized as volitional sensory motor acts, such as tracking tasks,
for which performance takes place without conscious control. At the intermediate level,
rule-based behavior is based on stored rules or procedures selected from previous
successful experiences in similar situations. Finally, at the highest level is knowledgebased behavior or goal-controlled behavior for which no rules are available from previous
encounters. At this level, individuals formulate behavioral responses based on the
analysis of cues within the environment and the goals of the individual.
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Knowledge-based domain
Evaluate
Ultimate
Goal

Ambiguity

Interpret
Target State
System State

Define Task

Identify

Rule-based domain

Task

Alert

Formulate
procedure

Activate

Set of
observations

Procedure

Execute

Observe

Skill-based domain

Figure 1: Rasmussen’s (1986) Decision Ladder.

The decision ladder in Figure 1 depicts the relationship between these levels of
cognitive control and decision phases. The boxes in the ladder illustrate the information
processing activities involved in each decision phase and the circles represent the
information or knowledge produced, which feed into the next decision phase. In general,
data from the environment is observed and cues an evaluation and interpretation of the
data. The individual’s response to these environmental cues is formulated and an action
is executed. It is well established in the literature that human decision making is often
characterized by the use of heuristics, or shortcuts to this decision making process (see
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), such as availability and representativeness. The model
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depicted here is a normative model in that it describes what people should do ideally and
can be used as a frame of reference for fault management. Many decision support
applications have been developed based on normative models, such as this (Edwards,
1987). More descriptive models of expert decision making strategies may have utility.
However, they are beyond the scope of this investigation into a basic understanding of
the feedback needed to support fault diagnosis.
The decision ladder discussed above can be applied across a variety of situations,
activities, and decision types. For the purposes of this investigation, the focus is on fault
management decision-making. In fault management, a fault represents an abnormal state
of the system that has the potential to impact the successful achievement of the mission,
in this case, the land attack mission. Rogers, Schutte, and Latorella (1996) describe fault
management in terms of four operational tasks, or ‘threads of activity’. These are
detection, diagnosis, prognosis, and compensation. Detection involves the recognition
that an abnormality has occurred and that the operator must intervene in the process.
Diagnosis is the activity that is performed to determine both the cause of the abnormality
and the consequences of the failure. Prognosis is the activity that the operator performs
to predict future states caused by the fault over time. Finally, the task of compensation
utilizes the preceding task to determine the appropriate response to the fault. As is
evident from the descriptions above, each of these fault management tasks require the
operator to perform different information processing activities and each of these activities
has different knowledge requirements.
Rogers and his colleagues have mapped each of these functions onto Rasmussen’s
(1986) “decision ladder’, which depicts the relationship between skill-based, rule based,
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and knowledge based control and the fault management ‘threads of activity’ described
above (see Figure 2). As the figure shows, the operational tasks involved in fault
management follow a path, which, in the initial operational stages of the fault, relies on
bottom-up data (e.g., alerts, sensor data, etc.) to detect that there is a problem and to
begin to diagnose what that problem is. The operator is then faced with the challenge of
evaluating and interpreting the data so that he or she may perform the necessary
compensatory actions. Key decisions are made at this point in fault management that
determine how the operator predicts the impact of the fault on the mission (prognosis)
and how to respond (compensation) to the fault.

Knowledge-based
domain
Evaluate
Ultimate
Goal

Ambiguity

DIAGNOSIS
DIAGNOSIS

Interpret

PROGNOSIS
PROGNOSIS
Target
State

System
State

Define
Task

Identify

Task

Alert

Rule-based domain
Formulate
procedure

Activate

DETECTION
DETECTION

COMPENSATION
COMPENSATIONProcedure

Set of
observations

Execute
Observe

Skill-based domain

Figure 2: Fault Management Activities Mapped onto Rasmussen’s (1986) Decision
Ladder. From Rogers, Schutte, and Latorella (1996)
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The application of human factors to the design of displays and controls can do
much to support fault management at the skill-based levels and rule-based levels of
detection and compensation. Activity at these levels is, in large part, based on familiar
situation and internalized routines and rules. Arguably, it is at the knowledge-based
processing level, diagnosis and prognosis phases of fault management that decision
support tools can be of the most benefit during the (see Figure 3).

Evaluate Options
Choose Relevant Goals

Ultimate
Goal

Ambiguity

Interpret, Predict
Consequences in Terms
of Goals and Constraints

Target
State

System
State

Figure 3: Rasmussen’s (1986) Knowledge-based Fault Management Activities.

At this level, the situations are non-routine and rules are not available to the
operator. In Rasmussen’s (1986) model, the evaluation and interpretation that occurs
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during these phases requires considerations of the ambiguity of the data for diagnosing
and produces a goal for the operator of how to compensate for the fault. Once the targetstate of the system is determined, the operator can then formulate the necessary tasks and
procedures to compensate for the fault effectively.
The following section will focus on the processes that occur at the knowledgebased level and the information that is necessary, via feedback from a decision support
tool, to successfully diagnose faults, develop prognoses, and determine compensatory
actions in fault situations.

Feedback for Fault Management

The models of fault management described above provide insight into the
information that a decision support tool would need to provide for successful fault
diagnosis and prognosis. Figure 3 illustrates the activities that occur and the information
requirements at the knowledge-based level of the fault management hierarchy. A
feedback loop of two information-processing activities occurs at the knowledge-based
level: evaluation and interpretation. According to Rasmussen (1986), during the
evaluation activity, the decision-maker evaluates options and selects a relevant goal.
During the interpretation activity, the decision-maker predicts the consequences of taking
an action in terms of the relevant goals and constraints of the mission and the current
situation.
Within this loop, the decision-maker generally requires three types of knowledge
or information. First, the current system-state is provided by identification of the
8

problem during the detection stage and early in the diagnosis stage and serves as input
into the knowledge-based processing and predicting the consequences of the fault. The
two remaining information sources that are required serve as the connections between
evaluation and interpretation processes and can be provided to assist the operator through
a decision support tool. These are (1) information on the mismatch between normal
operation (ambiguity) and the current systems state and (2) information pertaining to the
ultimate goal or target state (ultimate goal) of the system.
The following section will describe the domain of interest for the current
investigation and a decision support tool designed to assist operators in decisions at the
knowledge-based level of processing. This section will provide the context for further
discussion on the appropriate information needed to support decisions made during both
the diagnosis and prognosis (knowledge-based) stages in fault management.

Context: Naval Surface Fire Support Domain

Historically, fault management investigation has been performed within the
context of only a few domains characterized by complex systems consisting of tightly
coupled physical components. Examples of these domains include nuclear power,
process control, and aviation. However, the utility of fault management theories is not
limited to these types of physical systems. The domain of interest in the current study,
Naval Surface Fire Support, is one example of a system in which fault management
theories can be applied to investigate what information is required by operators to
successfully resolve a system fault.
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The task of Naval Surface Fire Support involves firing on land targets within a
pre-planned mission schedule to provide support for a land attack mission. Like the
traditional domains of interest mentioned above, Naval Surface Fire Support consists of
tightly coupled interacting components. However, these components can include both
physical (i.e., mechanical) components such as guns, ammunition, transducers, and
hydraulic systems as well as other system entities like friendly and enemy troops, aircraft,
targets, and the gun commander. Further, Naval Surface Fire Support can be described
as a process in that the role of the operator is to maintain a preplanned mission schedule
despite faults that may occur within the system. Faults, in this case, are abnormal states,
which threaten the mission schedule. These faults can include the physical breakdown of
mechanical components of the guns. For example, a leaking hydraulic seal within a
particular gun may render it inoperable for future targets and threaten performance within
the mission schedule. System faults can also be brought about by entities within the
battle. For example, friendly troops could move into proximity of an active target,
making firing on a target risky and threatening adherence to the mission schedule.
Moreover, these faults can interact with one another, as is the case when a particular gun
problem makes it less accurate and the movement of entities in the environment makes
accuracy critical to conforming to the mission schedule.
Not only do the elements of the Naval Surface Fire Support domain map to the
elements of other domains traditionally studied in fault management tasks, but the
activities of the operators within this domain are quite similar as well. Gun commanders
follow the same ‘threads of activity’ described by Rogers et al. (1996) of detection,
diagnosis, prognosis, and compensation.
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In the current investigation, detection of a mechanical gun fault is a somewhat
trivial task in that the decision support tool that is used as a testbed alerts the operator
when it detects one. Detection of faults involving entities within the battle is a more
complex task involving visual monitoring of the battlefield and auditory monitoring of a
communication circuit. For these entities, the operator must detect when the movement
of entities like aircraft and troops have the potential to change the firing plan and threaten
the mission schedule.
In the more traditional fault management domains, diagnosis is a process of
identifying the cause of abnormal states of the system and inferring the consequences of
that aberration on other physical systems components. Operators of nuclear power plants
and pilots of advanced automation aircraft often must identify which of a number of
potential root causes are the source of a needle deflection and then interpret how the
responsible component impacts other components. In contrast, the tasks involved in
diagnosis of physical faults (gun casualties) in Naval Surface Fire Support faults, are not
as heavily focused on identifying the cause of the fault. In fact, for the current
investigation, this information is explicitly provided to the operator at the detection phase
when they are alerted to a particular gun problem. Rather, the focus of diagnosis is more
on the potential impact of the abnormality on other system components, which, as
described previously may be either physical components or battle entities.
Like prognosis of more traditional fault management domains, the task of
prognosis in Naval Surface Fire Support involves inferring the consequences of taking an
action in response to a system fault on the success or failure of the mission. For example,
one response to a gun problem may be to cancel firing on a specific target. However, if
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that target is high priority and critical to the success of the mission, the operator may
have to consider other alternatives.
Finally, the compensation task within the Naval Surface Fire Support domain is
essentially the same as it is in the more traditional domains. Once the appropriate course
of action has been determined, the operator implements the appropriate action. In the
majority of cases in the current study, performing this course of action is accomplished
through selection of an option within the decision support testbed.

Resolution of Ambiguity: Logic Trace Feedback

Figure 3 shows that knowledge that resolves diagnostic ambiguity is a key
component in the interpretation and evaluation process of fault management tasks.
Results of several investigations have suggested that providing users with topographical
information of the interrelationships of system components and failures can provide
considerable benefit in knowledge-based processing and fault diagnosis. (Rasmussen,
1986; Kieras, 1992; Edlund & Lewis, 1994; Moore & Corbridge, 1996). For example, in
a series of studies, Kieras (1992) obtained significant improvements in performance from
participants in a malfunction diagnosis task by providing diagrammatic displays of the
engineered systems. Kieras and Bovair (1984) made a somewhat similar manipulation in
the context of training users of a complex device. Two groups of participants received
identical training on the procedures to operate a control panel device (rote training) with
no instruction on the interrelationships between components. In addition, one group
(model group) also received approximately 15 minutes of ‘model training’ in which flow
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diagrams and a simple description of how the components of the system interacted were
presented. Their results showed that participants in the model group were able to learn a
novel procedure 28% faster and showed significantly better retention when tested
subsequently than the rote group. A major finding of these studies was that providing
this type of information to participants in the diagnosis task significantly improved the
quality of diagnoses.
Rasmussen (1985) suggests that the benefits of providing topographical
information lie in providing the causal structure to the diagnostician. Yoon & Hammer
(1988) propose that there are two further advantages to the use of topographical
information in decision aiding in fault management. First, the representation is highly
understandable to humans. Second, it provides a decomposition that allows the operator
to make predictions and reason causally about the system. However, as the problem space
increases in graphically displayed networks, operators are less able to perform optimally
on a fault diagnosis task (Rouse, 1978). For the current investigation, topographical
information will be provided to operators in a textual form, which provides the user with
knowledge of which nodes in the process were considered by the decision support tool in
determining a recommended course of action. For example, for a particular gun problem
the feedback would take the following form:
Pending target assigned to this mount? Y
Can pending target be cancelled? N
Conflicting target? Y
Is target time sensitive? N
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Feedback in this format would provide operators with a concise logical trace of
only those decision nodes directly involved in the diagnosis and formulation of the
recommended course of action for the particular fault.
Rogers, Schutte, and Latorella (1996) note that it is generally accepted that
diagnosis is not only limited to identifying the cause of the failure, but it also
encompasses the interpretation of the consequences of the system failure on other
systems. This is the definition of diagnosis that is used in the current investigation. In
fact, the decision support tool that is used in this study correctly and accurately identifies
the source of the problem for the operator (e.g., hydraulic seal leaking). The task of the
operator is to interpret what the problem means in the context of other systems and
environmental entities (e.g., other guns, the battlefield, targets, friendly forces, low flying
aircraft, etc.). For example, transducer damage is a particular gun casualty that degrades
the accuracy of projectiles. If this problem arises, but it is not important that projectiles
are accurate for the target to which the gun is assigned, then transducer damage does not
represent a problem. However, if friendly troops are in the vicinity of this target, then the
importance of being accurate is paramount.

Considering Ultimate Goals: Mission Impact Feedback

A second type of information necessary in the knowledge-based processing level
of fault management is information, which maps the consequences of following a
particular compensatory action to the goals of the operator. This feedback supports
prognoses by allowing the operator to predict the consequences in terms of the goals and
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constraints of the mission. Shraagen (1997) emphasized the importance of providing
information to predict future states in the development of a decision support tool for
novice naval damage control (DC) officers. In a task analysis of both experts and novice
DC officers, the novice officers were often unable to predict where fires were likely to
spread aboard ship thus limiting their ability to take preemptive actions. Feedback,
which allows operators to understand how their actions will affect future states, should
always be useful because it would allow operators to understand how the actions that they
perform now will impact the future and to compare their current goals to the predicted
future states. Several researchers have maintained that the feedback provided by
complex systems should map to the goals and expectations of operators. For example,
Endsley (1996) has argued that, for operator situation awareness in automated systems, it
is important that interfaces provide comprehensible information that maps to the
operator’s goals. Woods (1995) further argues that, in order to provide better
representations to operators of complex systems, it is critical to put data into context of
larger frames of reference, including the interests and expectations of the user. For the
purposes of the current investigation, participants must manage the impact of performing
a particular course of action in response to a fault on timely performance of the mission.
Feedback that maps the impact of a particular course of action onto pre-planned mission
goals should support prognoses by providing the information necessary to evaluate their
options and choose relevant goals for compensation.
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Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to better understand the role of feedback generated by
a decision support tool on the knowledge-based processes in fault diagnosis. The
normative fault management models of Rasmussen (1986) and Rogers, Smith and
Latorella (1996) suggest fault managers require topographical information of the cause
and effect relationships between systems to effectively diagnose faults and information
on the impact of potential actions on mission goals to make fault prognoses. Both of
these forms of information should, according to the models, support better decisionmaking, which should result in better compensatory actions in response to system faults.
A decision support tool for Naval gunfire support, known as the Naval Surface
Fire Support Assistant (NSFSA), provides a unique opportunity to investigate the impact
of providing each type of feedback described above, either alone or in combination. This
tool was developed under the Office of Naval Research’s Manning Affordability
Initiative to demonstrate the capability of using a cognitive modeling approach as an
architecture for a decision support tool. The iGen™ architecture behind this tool is
derived from the GOMS (Goals, Operators, Methods, Selection Rules) work of Card,
Moran, and Newell (1983) and utilizes notations for current problem representation,
cognitive and behavioral representations of the human/system interaction, and
representations of perceptual cues in the environment. A degree of context sensitivity is
also built into this framework such that the order in which tasks are executed is
dependent on the internal representation of the problem at a given point in time.
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Using the iGen™ architecture, the NSFSA decision support tool has the capability
to provide two types of feedback regarding gun casualties. First, it provides operators
with the logic and procedures that were used by the decision support tool to arrive at a
particular recommendation (logic trace feedback). The feedback provided to the operator
can be stated in terms of the trace of logic that the NSFSA traversed to reach particular
courses of action. Second, it can provide context specific feedback that elaborates on the
impact of selecting a course of action in response to a particular gun problem on the
mission in a reference scenario (mission impact feedback). This form of feedback can be
said to map to the operators’ goals in the context of the current state of the mission. .
The capability of the NSFSA to furnish operators with either of these two types of
feedback allows for the investigation of three aspects of the normative models described
above. First, it allows for the investigation of whether providing logic trace feedback
supports better diagnoses in fault management. Second, it provides the opportunity to
investigate whether mission impact feedback supports the formulation of better
prognoses. Finally, it allows for the study of whether providing both forms of feedback
supports better interpretation and evaluation of the situation, which results in better
compensation activities. Thus, the proposed study will compare fault management
performance for three methods of decision support feedback (logic trace, mission impact,
both) to determine how they affect knowledge-based processing activities. The following
sections will describe the predictions and approach that will be used to investigate these
issues.
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HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis I

It was expected that operators receiving either logic trace feedback, mission
impact, or both types of feedback would perform better on fault management tasks than
operators receiving only recommended courses of action. For this investigation, the
predicted outcome was that operators receiving some additional feedback would make
either a greater number of correct diagnoses on the effect of a gun casualty on the system
or a greater number of correct prognoses on the impact of a gun casualty on the
completion of a pre-planned Naval Surface Fire Support mission scenario in their gun
casualty reports. Further, it was predicted that operators receiving no additional feedback
would be significantly more likely to choose the ‘recommended’ course of action for
each gun casualty than operators receiving no additional feedback. Finally, operators
receiving feedback were predicted to have higher scores on the post-scenario fault
management questionnaire.

Hypothesis II

It was expected that operators receiving logic trace feedback would be better at
fault diagnosis than operators receiving mission impact feedback only. For the purposes
18

of this investigation, it was predicted that individuals in the logic trace feedback only
condition would make a significantly greater number of correct diagnoses in gun casualty
reports during performance on a Naval Surface Fire Support Mission than individuals
receiving mission impact feedback only. Further, it was expected that the participants in
the logic trace only condition would have significantly more correct answers on the
diagnostic portion of a post-scenario questionnaire.

Hypothesis III

It was expected that operators receiving mission impact feedback would provide
better prognoses of the faults on the mission than operators receiving only logic trace
feedback. It was predicted that participants in this group will make a significantly higher
number of correct reports on the impact of a gun casualty on the completion of a preplanned Naval Surface Fire Support mission scenario than individuals receiving logic
trace feedback only. Moreover, it was predicted that “mission impact only” participants
would score more correct answers on the prognostic portion of a post-scenario
questionnaire.

Hypothesis IV

It was expected that operators receiving both logic trace feedback and mission
impact feedback would be able to better compensate for system faults than operators
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receiving either mission impact feedback alone or logic trace feedback alone. In the
context of the current investigation, it was predicted that participants receiving both
forms of feedback would make significantly more correct responses to gun casualties in
the Naval Surface Fire Support scenario in significantly less time than participants
receiving only one form of feedback. Finally, it was predicted that the participant
receiving both forms of feedback would score higher on the compensation section of a
post-scenario questionnaire.
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METHOD

Participants

Sixty participants were recruited from introductory psychology classes at the
University of Central Florida and chose to either be paid for their participation in this
investigation or received course credit. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 31 years
(median age=21 years) and were evenly split between males (n=30) and females (n=30).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four feedback conditions (no feedback,
mission impact feedback, logic trace feedback, or both). While a more detailed analysis
of the demographic data will be provided in the results section, it should be mentioned
here that there were no significant differences between groups in age, class standing,
computer or video game experience. There were no restrictions on who was able to
participate in this investigation. An a priori rule was put into place that in the unlikely
event that any participants had a background in naval gunfire support, the data collected
from these participants would not be used in comparisons. However, no participants had
prior experience in the domain. Finally, all participants were treated in accordance with
ethical guidelines set forth by the “Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct” (American Psychological Association, 1992). Consequently, participants will
read and sign informed consent (Appendix A) and Privacy Act statements (Appendix B).
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Materials

Naval Surface Fire Support Assistant (NSFSA)

Two computer programs were utilized in this investigation. First was the Naval
Surface Fire Support Assistant (NSFSA) which was initially developed by CHI Systems
under the Office of Naval Research Manning Affordability Initiative to demonstrate the
use of a cognitive modeling technique (iGen™) in the design of automation and decision
support for future naval systems. The NSFSA is run on a standard personal computer and
provides users with notifications of gun problems (e.g., hydraulic seals leaking, ammo
low, etc.) and suggests a prioritized list of potential courses of action (cancel target,
reallocate target to another gun mount, etc.). As mentioned previously, the NSFSA can
provide feedback in two ways. First, the NSFSA software has been modified so that it
can provide feedback containing the logic that the model used to arrive at the prioritized
courses of action (logic trace). Second, it can provide explanation to the user of the
impact of potential courses of action on the mission based on the mission schedule and
target priority (mission impact). . For example, the explanation of a proposal to
reallocate a target to another gun mount because a hydraulic seal is leaking might be
explained to the user as “Reduces disruption to the original target schedule”. In contrast,
for the “logic trace” conditions, feedback takes the form of yes/no reports of the logical
nodes that the NSFSA traversed in arriving at its recommendations. Thus, feedback to
operators for reallocating a gun mount based on a hydraulic seal leaking took the
following form:
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Pending target assigned to this mount? Y
Can pending target be cancelled? N
Conflicting target? Y
Is target time sensitive? N

The NSFSA has the capability to provide logic trace feedback, mission impact
feedback, or both forms of feedback to the operator when a gun casualty occurs. As an
experimental testbed the NSFSA collects time-stamped data on each screen element that
the user clicks on during scenario runs and provides a spreadsheet of user actions for
analysis of latency and accuracy.

Jane's Fleet Command

The second software package, Jane’s Fleet Command ® (JFC), a commercially
available war game developed by Sonalysts Corporation, was run concurrently with
NSFSA during the experiment. This software provided the actual Naval Gunfire Support
Scenario on a standard personal computer. In essence, this is the ‘knowledge of the
external world’ for the participants and dynamically displays the tactical situation with a
view of the targets, surface ships and aircraft within the scenario using Naval Tactical
Data Symbology (NTDS). Participants had limited control of the JFC software during
the scenario run. Control was limited to being able to zoom in and out and pan the
display for better visibility of events within the scenario. This was accomplished through
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commands to the keyboard. Participants had no control over the movements of displayed
elements on the screen so that the scenario unfolded in the same way for each participant.
Jane's Fleet Command and the NSFSA were run synchronously, providing the
appearance that they were networked software.

Experimental Scenario

Two subject matter experts, working at the Navair Orlando Training Systems
Division developed an approximately one-hour land attack warfare scenario. This
scenario simulates some of the tasks that may be required of a gun commander assistant
onboard a future naval vessel providing surface gunfire support in a land attack mission.
Participants were responsible for the firing of 2 gun mounts (MT51 and MT52) aboard
own-ship on 30 ground targets. Appendix C contains a list of these targets and their
attributes. Targets were classified in terms of their type (e.g., armor, command post,
etc.), the category of target (e.g., accuracy sensitive, start time sensitive, etc.), and
priority on a 10-point scale (1=low, 10=high). Each of these targets was to be fired upon
at a pre-planned time with a given number of rounds. The participants could alter this
firing schedule based on the priority and category of target and the current gun problem.
Within the scenario, participants were confronted with 5 major types of gun
problems. Transducer damage negatively impacts the ability of the gun mount to fire
accurately on targets. Two problems are associated with the hydraulic seal on the gun
mount. A hot hydraulic seal does not in and of itself represent a problem unless
accompanied by hydraulic seal leaking. In this case, the gun mount may be damaged and
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not have the ability to service future targets. Recoil damage can also negatively impact
the guns ability to service future targets. Finally, there may be low ammunition in the
gun mount, which requires the participant to notify logistics and supply command for
replenishment. So, for example, if the NSFSA has identified a problem with a particular
gun mount, the participant may have to decide whether or not to cancel firing on a target,
reallocate the target to the other gun mount, or fire until gun failure. This decision may
be based upon target category, target priority and the context of the mission as displayed
in Jane’s Fleet Command ®. Contextual factors within the scenario, which affect
decisions, include such things as whether or not troops or aircraft are in the area of the
target.
In all, 28 gun problems were presented to participants during the scenario either
alone or in combination with one another. For 16 of these gun problems, the correct
course of action to take is that which is recommended by the NSFSA. However, for 12
of these problems, contextual factors within the scenario made selecting the
recommended solution either wrong or sub-optimal. This was accomplished by inserting
10 key events into the scenario, which make system recommendations about whether to
continue to fire on specific targets, to reallocate targets to another gun mount, to cancel
targets, or to use different ammunition incorrect. For example, during the scenario,
transducer damage occurs to a gun, which degrades its accuracy. The NSFSA
recommends reallocating the target to the other gun because the target assigned is
‘accuracy sensitive’. However, a ‘Red Cross humanitarian effort’ is also occurring in the
vicinity of the target at the same time. Thus, while the recommended course of action by
the decision support tool is to find a new way to fire on the target, the situational context
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in the scenario makes the best course of action to cancel the target to minimize the risk of
firing on humanitarian aid.
In some cases, these scenario events do not impact the correctness of the
recommended course of action. One involves the appearance of a high-flying aircraft in
the target area. During the training phase, participants are instructed that the ceiling for
projectiles is 18,000 feet. The high-flying aircraft is actually above this ceiling and
should not impact the mission. At this time, the NSFSA has made no recommendations
to cancel the targets and the correct response to this event should be for the participant to
report the high flyer to the TAO and accept the recommendation of the NSFSA to
continue firing on targets.

Fault Management Questionnaire

A 40-item fault management questionnaire was developed (see Appendix D),
which was administered after participants completed the experimental scenario. This
questionnaire was designed to assess participants’ knowledge in four areas: general
domain knowledge, diagnostic knowledge, prognostic knowledge, and compensatory
knowledge.
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General Domain Knowledge

Ten questions within the questionnaire were designed to assess participant
knowledge of the Naval Gunfire Support domain. In general, these questions focused on
declarative knowledge to which the participants were exposed in early training. For
example, this section contains questions about NTDS symbology, ammunition types,
target types, and mission goals.

Diagnostic Knowledge

Ten questions within the Fault Management Questionnaire focused on diagnosis
of the impact of faults on physical components and entities within the land attack
mission. Generally, these questions consisted of vignettes in which a fault is presented
along with relevant contextual factors of a mission. Participants were then asked through
multiple-choice questions to diagnose whether the fault represented a problem that
needed to be evaluated. For example, the vignette provided a gun fault that causes
rounds fired to be less accurate. The participant had to determine from the information
presented whether it was particularly necessary to be accurate and whether it was
possible to take specific courses of action recommended.
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Prognostic Knowledge

Ten questions in the questionnaire were designed to assess the ability of users to
determine how particular gun problems would impact the mission. Like the diagnostic
questions, these prognostic questions were in the form of brief vignettes followed by a
series of multiple-choice questions. For example, a particular gun problem may damage
the gun and make it unavailable to fire on future targets within the mission. However, it
may be that the situation is such that damage to the gun is less important than firing on a
specific target. The participant had to make a determination, based on the information
provided as to whether or not taking the recommended course of action will presents a
significant problem in terms of the goals for the mission and future targets.

Compensatory Knowledge

Within the Naval Gunfire Support domain, there are often several actions that can
be taken to achieve the same outcome. For example, if a gun problem degrades accuracy,
the problem can be remedied by either reallocating a particular target to another gun
mount or by using more accurate ammunition. Ten multiple choice questions within the
Fault Management Questionnaire were designed to assess the knowledge of users to
determine which compensatory actions may be appropriate for a given gun problem
within the context of the mission.
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Pre-performance Test

Appendix E contains the pretest all participants took after training was completed.
The 10-item pretest was developed to insure that the participants understand the
important aspects of the Naval gunfire support mission. Specifically, the test addressed
three areas. First, the pretest asks questions about each of the 5 potential gun problems
that could be present during the scenario and what assumptions can be made about them.
Second, questions address the nature of the ammunition that is available during the
mission. The final questions deal with aspects of the mission itself and are designed to
determine whether participants understood their role in terms of communication with the
TAO and their responsibilities for firing on targets. Once the participants completed this
pretest, the experimenter reviewed it and remediated the participants on any questions
that they did not answer correctly.

Participant Reaction Questionnaire

The Participant Reaction Questionnaire in Appendix F was designed to be
administered following performance on the experimental scenario. The purpose of this
10-item questionnaire is to obtain participant feedback on aspects of the decision support
tool, the training, and the scenario. Further, questions will address how much confidence
participants had in the recommendations of the NSFSA and how well participants
believed they performed the experimental tasks.
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Design

The experiment followed a one-way, between-subjects design. The betweensubjects factor was the feedback condition consisting of four levels (no feedback, logic
trace feedback, mission impact feedback, or both).

No Feedback

The no feedback condition served as a control for this investigation and data were
collected to determine whether, in fact, providing feedback in addition to recommended
courses of action significantly improved diagnostic, prognostic, and compensatory
performance in a fault management task. In this condition, no feedback in addition to
recommended courses of action was provided on the Naval Surface Fire Support
Assistant decision support tool to the operators when gun casualties arise.

Logic Trace Feedback Condition

In the logic trace feedback condition, the same potential courses of action were
provided to the participants as were provided in the mission impact feedback conditions.
However, the feedback about each recommended course of action differed in that it was
in the form of the logic that the NSFSA used to determine the courses of action. For
example, a “hydraulic seal hot” in the gun mount might have yielded a recommended
course of action to reallocate the target to another gun mount. The feedback for this
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recommended course of action in this condition took the form: Is there a next pending
target? Y, Did this mount have problem hydraulic seal leaking? Y, Can problem target be
reallocated to another gun mount? N, etc.

Mission Impact Feedback Condition

In the mission impact feedback condition, the NSFSA provided feedback about
the impact of the recommended courses of action on mission schedule so that participants
could make their decision about which course of action to select. So, for example, a
recommendation to fire until gun failure might include feedback that tells the operator
that selecting this course of action would mean that this gun mount would not be
available to service a future target in the scenario.

Combined Feedback Condition

Participants in the combined feedback condition receive the same recommended
courses of action for each gun casualty but the NSFSA displays both the mission impact
feedback and the logic trace feedback described above.
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Procedure

Figure 4 depicts the experimental procedure for this investigation. Initially,
experimental runs consisted of administration of informed consent, a privacy act
statement and a demographic questionnaire.

Administrative
Administrative Tasks
Tasks
Consent
Consent Form
Form
Demographics
Demographics Form
Form
Random
Random Assignment
Assignment

Mission
Mission
Impact
Impact
Feedback
Feedback
Group
Group

Logic
Logic Trace
Trace
Feedback
Feedback
Group
Group

Combined
Combined
Feedback
Feedback
Group
Group

No
No
Feedback
Feedback
Control
Control
Group
Group

NSFS
NSFS Domain
Domain Training
Training
NSFSA
NSFSA Training
Training
Facilitated
Facilitated Training
Training Scenario
Scenario on
on JFC/NSFSA
JFC/NSFSA
Practice
Practice Scenario
Scenario JFC/NSFSA
JFC/NSFSA
Performance
Performance Scenario
Scenario Run
Run
Fault
Fault Management
Management Questionnaire
Questionnaire

.

Trainee
Trainee Reactions
Reactions Questionnaire
Questionnaire
Debrief
Debrief

Figure 4: Experimental Procedure
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Following random assignment to groups, all participants received the same
training procedure with one exception. Displays of the NSFSA testbed software during
the training presentations and practice scenarios were consistent with the feedback
condition to which the participant has been assigned. In other words, Logic Trace
participants were shown slides of the software with logic trace feedback shown, Mission
Impact participants saw mission impact feedback, and participants assigned to the group
receiving both feedback forms saw both in the training.
The training consisted of an initial familiarization with the NSFS domain and a
familiarization with the software to be used. Next, participants had the opportunity to
practice the task. Initially the experimenter facilitated this practice and then participants
had the opportunity to perform tasks on a scenario without assistance. Participants then
performed an experimental run followed by a knowledge test, and the administration of a
trainee reaction questionnaire. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their
participation. The following sections will describe each part of this procedure in more
detail.

Training

Domain Training

Upon completion of informed consent and demographics forms, all participants
began initial training on the Naval Gunfire Support domain utilized for the experiment.
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This initial training consisted of two videotaped training modules and ‘hands on’
instruction with the JFC domain software. The first videotaped module consisted of
approximately 10 minutes of instruction on the tasks of the Naval Gun Commander and
the components of Naval Gunfire Support mission. During this training module,
participants became familiar with the overall objectives of the mission, which included
firing on tactical surface targets and reporting on contacts within the battle area. The
primary responsibilities of the gun commander were to report gun problems to the
Tactical Action Officer (TAO) and to recommend and execute courses of action based on
the attributes of the mission such as the target schedule, and placement of friendly and
hostile forces in the vicinity of targets. Following the initial training on the duties and
responsibilities of gun commander, participants were trained via videotape to use the JFC
software for the reference mission. This training included detailed descriptions of the
display elements and the ‘button logy’ of the reference mission software. During this
segment of training, participants became familiar with Naval Tactical Data Symbology
(NTDS) and learned how to report attributes (e.g., altitude, bearing, and target type) of
aircraft and surface ships displayed on Jane’s Fleet command with the aid of a template
to the TAO. Further, participants were instructed on how to make recommendations (see
Appendix D), to the TAO. During this phase of training, participants performed all of the
tasks necessary to use the JFC software to zoom in and out, and to pan the screen.
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NSFSA Training

During the NSFSA phase of the training, participant were presented with a
videotaped description of all of the elements of the tool. Participants were encouraged
during this videotape session to ask questions of the experimenter. The videotape
described the purpose of the tool and how to use it. Each screen element and actions for
use at the mouse-click level were described in detail. During this tape, participants were
instructed on each class of gun problem, target attributes and types of ammunition used in
the scenario. During this time, participants were also provided with templates (see
Appendix I) for the gun problem reports that they would make and given instruction on
how and when to make these reports. All button actions that were required during
performance on the scenarios were described. As mentioned previously, on slides that
depict the NSFSA, the feedback that was shown was consistent with the condition to
which the participant has been assigned.

Facilitated Practice

After training on the domain and the software needed to perform the experimental
task, participants were given the opportunity to perform a practice scenario with the aid
of the experimenter. During this 15-minute scenario, participants used templates to make
reports on events occurring on the JFC display and gun problems displayed on the
NSFSA. The experimenter pointed out relevant aspects of the scenario when appropriate
and answered any questions that the participant may have had during this time.
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Individual Practice

Following the facilitated practice, the participant performed the practice scenario
solo. Again, the feedback provided by the NSFSA was consistent with the condition to
which the participant was assigned. During this phase of the training, the participants
were still encouraged to ask questions of the experimenter, but the experimenter did not
actively point out relevant aspects of the mission or guide the process. The experimenter
did, however, provide feedback to the participant following performance on the
individual practice scenario. As a final performance check, the participant was asked to
complete the Pre-performance Questionnaire at the end of this phase of training. The
experimenter checked this 10-item questionnaire and provided any remedial information
to the participant that was indicated by the responses.

Performance

After participants completed the training, they performed the experimental
scenario described above. During this phase of the experiment, participants used both
software tools and made tactical reports and gun casualty reports to the experimenter,
who acted as the Tactical Action Officer (TAO). The experimenter provided no
information to the participant during the experiment except to acknowledge receipt of the
report by responding, “TAO, Aye.” As the participant was performing the scenario, the
experimenter was collecting dependent measures on a coding sheet, shown in Appendix
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J. This coding sheet listed each of the thirty gun casualties that occurred during the
scenario, the correct response, and the correct rationale for the response as determined by
the subject matter expert designers. The experimenter coded whether or not the correct
action was taken, and whether the rationale for the action was consistent with the
rationale provided.
After performance on the scenario, participants were asked to complete the Fault
Management Questionnaire (Appendix D) and the Trainee Reaction Questionnaire
(Appendix F). Upon completion of both questionnaires, participants were debriefed,
thanked for participating and excused.

Dependent Measures

Diagnoses

Two main dependent measures were used to test the hypothesis that participants
receiving logic trace only feedback would provide better diagnoses than participants
receiving mission impact feedback. First, diagnoses obtained from gun casualty reports
were assessed against an expert solution of the mission provided by the subject matter
experts who designed the scenario. Part of the gun casualty report that users made was to
describe why performing particular courses of action represented problems in terms of
other components of the mission. For example, for a report of transducer damage to a
mount, the report template required that the user report. “TAO, GUNS, I have
TRANSDUCER DAMAGE to MT51. This (IS)/IS NOT a problem for us now because
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IT DEGRADES THE ACCURACY OF PROJECTILES. I recommend
REALLOCATING TARGET 7 to MT52 because TARGET 7 is ACCURACY
SENSITIVE”. The diagnosis that the “transducer damage degrades the accuracy of the
mount” would be considered a correct diagnosis of the problem and counted as such.
Thus, responses on the portion of the gun casualty report template that corresponds to the
information in the logic trace feedback was evaluated against the expert solution. As
such, the first dependent measure for diagnosis was the number of correct/incorrect
diagnoses made over the course of the mission.
The second dependent measure to test the diagnosis hypotheses was the number
of correct responses to the diagnostic questions on the Fault Management Questionnaire.

Prognoses

The second hypothesis for this investigation was that users receiving mission
impact feedback would make better prognoses of the impact of the performing specific
courses of action on the maintaining the mission plan. The dependent measures for
prognoses were collected online via the gun casualty reports. The portion of the report
that corresponds to mission impact, that a particular target was accuracy sensitive and
therefore cannot be fired upon from that mount was evaluated against the expert solution
for correctness and the frequency of correct/incorrect actions was used as a dependent
measure. Second, scores on the prognosis questions of the Fault Management
Questionnaire was used as a dependent measure.
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Compensation

The third hypothesis tested addressed whether users receiving both logic trace and
mission impact feedback performed better compensatory actions than users who received
one form of feedback alone. This hypothesis was primarily evaluated by the number of
courses of action taken correctly/incorrectly and scores on the compensation section of
the Fault Management Questionnaire. Further, the latency of performing correct actions
was collected from the output files of the NSFSA to determine whether receiving both
forms of feedback results in the ability to take the appropriate action more quickly.
While participants will be required to ready roughly twice as much feedback in the ‘both’
condition, the statements are relatively short. The time to read the additional feedback
should be negligible and the advantages of having both forms of feedback readily
available should result in faster decision times

Analysis

The analyses of each of these measures were accomplished by performing oneway between-subjects a priori analyses of variance across the three conditions (logic
trace, mission impact, both). These tests determined whether any observed differences
between groups represented statistically significant main effects vice random differences
that may be attributed to chance.
The major hypotheses stated that logic trace feedback would support better
diagnostic decision making, mission impact feedback would support better prognoses,
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and providing both would result in better compensation for gun problems. It was further
predicted that providing some form of feedback would result in better performance than
providing no feedback in addition to recommended courses of action. One way analyses
of variance across the dependent measures described in the preceding sections will
statistically determine whether these directional hypotheses are supported.
In addition to the analyses described above, analyses of variance were performed
on the demographic data to determine whether randomly assigned groups were equivalent
on variables such as age and computer experience. Similarly, responses to trainee
reactions was analyzed using statistical tests appropriate to the data for investigation of
how feedback condition may have impacted participant reactions to the testing.

RESULTS

Random Assignment

An analysis of the demographic data collected from questionnaires demonstrated
no significant differences between the experimental conditions in gender, age, class
standing, computer experience, or videogame experience. Table 1 provides detail of the
participant demographics for median age, gender ratio, computer experience, and
videogame experience.
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Table 1: Participant Background Variables by Condition.

Combined
Feedback

Condition
Mission
Logic
Impact
Trace

No
Feedback

p

Median Age
(years)

21.5

20

22.0

21

> .05

Gender
(M/F)

10/5

5/10

8/7

7/8

>.05

Computer
Experience*

3.86

3.80

3.80

3.87

>.05

Videogame
Experience**

2.79

3.20

2.60

2.67

>.05

*1 to 4 scale. 1=What’s a computer, 5=frequently use computers
**1 to 5 scale: 1=Never play videogames, play frequently.

Analysis of the class standing data also revealed no signification differences between the
groups in the education levels of the participants. The majority of participants were
junior level or above in class standing with 11 participants at the graduate level.

Hypothesis I Results

It was expected that operators receiving either logic trace feedback, mission
impact, or both types of feedback would perform better at fault management tasks than
operators receiving only recommended courses of action. However, the results of a priori
one-way analysis of variance did not support this hypothesis. This the accuracy data
yielded no significant differences between the participants who did not receive additional
feedback over and above a recommended course of action and those who did in the
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average number of correct rationales for selecting a course of action. Table 3 shows the
mean number of correct responses to gun problems for each of the conditions. While
there were no statistically significant differences between groups in the mean numbers of
correct actions, participants with no feedback were correct less of the time in the
diagnostic reasoning that they provided for why they had chosen a particular course of
action to take. Across the scenario, participants receiving some form of feedback
provided, on average, 14.13 correct diagnostic rationales. This was compared to
participants receiving no feedback, who, on average, provided 11.9 correct rationales
across the scenario t(27)=1.82, p<.05. This effect did not hold true for prognostic
reasoning as there were no significant differences between feedback conditions in the
frequency of correct reasons given on the impact of the gun casualty and the selected
course of action on the mission.

Table 2.
Frequency of Correct Responses to Gun Casualties by Condition

Combined Feedback
Mission Impact
Logic Trace
No Feedback

Mean Number Correct
19.1
20.0
20.2
20.5
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Std. Dev
3.84
3.25
2.37
2.57

Hypothesis II Results

It was expected that operators receiving logic trace feedback would be better at
fault diagnosis than operators receiving mission impact feedback only. For the purposes
of this investigation, it was predicted that individuals in the logic trace feedback only
condition would make a significantly greater number of correct diagnoses in gun casualty
reports during performance on a Naval Surface Fire Support Mission than individuals
receiving mission impact feedback only. This was assessed by the number of correct
rationales given across the scenario for the selection of courses of action in reports to the
role-player supervisor in the investigation. A between groups t-test of the number of
correct rationales provided by the logic trace group and the mission impact group did not
yield support for this hypothesis. While the mean number of correct rationales given was
greater for the logic trace condition (mean=14.1, std. dev.=5.07) than the mean number
for the mission impact group (mean = 13.6, std. dev. 6.81), this difference was not
statistically significant. Further, it was expected that the participants in the logic trace
only condition would have significantly more correct answers on the diagnostic portion
of a post-scenario questionnaire.
Of the ten diagnosis questions on the post-scenario fault management
questionnaire, participants in the logic trace condition scored a mean of 9.8 questions
correct (std. dev=1.15), while those in the mission impact group responded to a mean of
9.47 items correctly (std. dev. = 0.99). The high correct response rates to these questions,
for these two groups as well as the other groups indicates that participants were highly
aware of the correct reasoning for the selection of a particular course of action.
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Hypothesis III Results

It was expected that operators receiving mission impact feedback would provide
better prognoses of the faults on the mission than operators receiving only logic trace
feedback. Operationally this meant that participants in this group would make a
significantly higher number of correct reports on the impact of a gun casualty on the
completion of a pre-planned Naval Surface Fire Support mission scenario than
individuals receiving logic trace feedback only. However, the data did not support this
hypothesis. While the a priori one-way analysis of variance did not show the two groups
to have significantly different frequencies of correct report, mission impact participants
on average were slightly less correct in their reports than logic trace participants, with
means of 15.2 and 15.8 correct reports, respectively. The same analysis was performed
on the number of correct answers to the 10 mission impact items on the post-scenario
fault management questionnaire. Mission impact participants, on average, scored 5.87
correct on the mission impact questions, while logic trace participants scored 6.4 correct.
However, these results were not statistically significant.

Hypothesis IV Results

The final hypothesis in this investigation was that operators receiving both the
logic trace feedback and the mission impact feedback would be able to better compensate
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for system faults than operators receiving either mission impact feedback alone or logic
trace feedback alone. In the context of the current investigation, it was predicted that
participants receiving both forms of feedback will make significantly more correct
responses to gun casualties in the Naval Surface Fire Support scenario in significantly
less time than participant receiving only one form of feedback. In fact, on average, these
participants made slightly fewer correct compensatory actions (19.07 correct) than
participants in the mission impact (20 correct), logic trace (20.2 correct), or no feedback
conditions (20.5 correct), although this difference was not statistically significant.
Further, there were no significant differences in the amount of time that it took for
participants receiving combined feedback (115 seconds, std. dev.=55) to respond to a gun
casualty than it did for participants receiving one form of feedback (118 seconds, std.
dev. =28.7).
During observations of the data collection the researcher noted that, on several of
the gun casualties related to transducer damage, which reduces the accuracy of the gun
that participants were reallocating the target to the other gun and then switching
ammunition to ERGM. Switching to ERGM was an unnecessary extra step, which was
advised against in the training since it was an additional expense with no benefit to the
accuracy in these cases. Consequently, analyses were performed to determine whether
one or several groups performed this error of commission more often than any other
group. Interestingly, participants receiving both forms of feedback (logic trace and
mission impact) made significantly fewer of these errors of commission than the other
groups t(27)=1.963, p=.05.
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Finally, it was predicted that the participant receiving both forms of feedback
would score higher on the compensation section of a post-scenario questionnaire. This
hypothesis was not supported by a priori one-way analysis of variance conducted on the
questionnaire data. There were no significant differences between the groups in the
number of correct responses to the compensation questions on the fault management
questionnaire.

Trainee Reaction Questionnaire

Table 3 provides the means to the overall participant reactions to the task and the
training provided during the experiment. The actual questionnaire that was used to assess
these reactions is provided in Appendix F. The ratings were anchored with 1 being ‘not
at all’ and 7 being either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ (satisfied, well, etc.) in response to the
questions. Results of the analyses of these data indicate that overall participants appeared
to have no strong reactions to the dimensions above, neither feeling that they performed
particularly well or poorly, that the training was particularly satisfying, or that the
decision support tool helped in performing the task. Further analysis of these data by
condition revealed no significant differences between the groups in response to any of the
individual questions. Thus, only the mean ratings of these questions are offered to
demonstrate that no strong feelings were evoked of the participants by the training, the
scenario, the Naval Surface Fire Support Assistant or the difficulty of the task.
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Table 3. Mean Trainee Reaction Questionnaire Ratings.

Question
Performance
Satisfaction with
Training
Understood Task
NSFSA Helpfulness
Confidence in NSFSA
Decision support by
NSFSA
Feedback supporting
performance
Feedback supporting
diagnosis
Feedback supporting
mission impact
understanding?
Feedback supporting
COA
Feedback supporting
accept/reject decision

Condition
Logic
No
Trace
Feedback
4.07
3.87

Combined
4.00

Mission
Impact
3.80

4.60
4.20
4.80
4.80

5.13
4.60
5.73
5.00

5.07
4.73
5.60
5.07

5.00
4.60
4.73
4.73

4.95
4.53
5.22
4.90

5.53

5.53

5.60

5.07

5.43

5.20

5.47

5.53

5.00

5.30

4.87

5.07

5.07

4.67

4.92

4.60

5.13

4.60

4.87

4.80

4.40

5.47

4.67

4.67

4.80

5.00

5.13

5.13

5.20

5.12

Overall
3.93

This could be interpreted to mean that participants did not particularly feel negative about
the experiment and were not particularly overworked or overstressed by the tasks that
they performed.
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DISCUSSION

Several interpretations of the results of this investigation can be drawn from the
lack of significant support for the hypotheses. First, it could be argued that the predictive
capabilities of Rasmussen’s (1986) fault management model do not generalize beyond
the domains of process control into military fault management decision-making. An
alternative interpretation is that the investigation was, in some manner, invalid and did
not adequately test the hypotheses. The following sections will investigate these two
possibilities to critically examine whether either possibility represents a plausible
explanation of the results.

Process Control and Military Decision Making Differences.

This investigation represents a first step toward the application of Rasmussen’s
(1986) fault management decision ladder to fault management in a complex military
domain. While the origins of the model were heavily rooted in process control domains
like the nuclear power and chemical process control plant operations, the validity of the
model rests in its ability to predict fault management decision making across a range of
domains. At first glance, the results of the current investigation could be interpreted as
an indication that the Rasmussen (1986) fault management decision making model
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focuses on traditional process control tasks and does not have application in complex
military decision making tasks. In other words, the two domains are sufficiently different
that the model does not apply. However, this view would be a very narrow interpretation
of the capability of the model to predict fault management decision-making.
Fault management decision making within traditional process control domains are
likely to share the same major decision making processes as those in complex military
fault management decision making. Specifically, both domains share the processes of
detection, diagnosis, prognosis, and compensation posited by Rogers et al. (1986).
However, where the two domains differ most notably is in two of the factors, which
influence how individuals evaluate and interpret faults during diagnosis and prognosis.
These are the level of ambiguity in the data and the ultimate goal or target state. In
general, well-defined and highly predictable physical processes govern process control
tasks. The number and complexity of these predictable variables and the interaction
between them drive ambiguity in process control (Moray, 1997; Woods and Hanes,
1986). The target state for this domain is often to reach some level of stability in often
slow (long lag time) processes. Conversely, within military fault management decisionmaking, ambiguity is driven primarily by human behavior, of enemy, neutral, and
friendly forces at a much faster pace. While the behavioral sciences continue to improve
our capability to predict human performance and decision-making, the fact remains that
our ability to make these predictions is not equivalent to predicting performance of
physical processes.
The goal or target state is also less well defined in military fault management
decision-making. A stable steady state is often neither possible nor desired. For
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example, in several of the gun casualties in this investigation, the operator was given a
choice between reallocating firing to another gun mount or firing until gun failure.
Depending on the criticality of the target and the ultimate goals of the mission, firing
until gun failure was the only reasonable option that could be taken.

Thus, there are

circumstances in military combat where it is reasonable and, in fact sometimes laudable,
to allow a weapons system to be destroyed to meet the objectives of the mission or to
save the lives of friendly combatants.
These two differences between process control and military fault management
decision-making, differing degrees of ambiguity in the tasks and differing target or goal
states, may explain the lack of support that the current investigation showed for the
application of this model to the domain. Future investigations should focus on increasing
the predictive validity of the model by refining the fault management model to account
for these differences.

Experimental Validity

A major goal of this investigation was to address the need for decision support
tools to provide assistance to Navy warfighters in an increasing complex and uncertain
domain perform their jobs effectively with fewer people. This real world problem
required a premium to be placed on the external validity of this applied investigation.
However, with this emphasis, come potential threats to other areas of experimental
validity, which must be considered when undertaking an investigation of this type.
Perhaps the most comprehensive review of these threats to validity, countermeasures
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against them and the interactions between types of validity can be found in Cook and
Campbell (1986). As these authors point out, applied research often has a different set of
priorities than highly controlled laboratory research. As a result, tradeoffs often must be
made to support generalization to a specific targeted setting or a particular group of
interest. One could interpret the lack of statistical support for the hypotheses in this
investigation to be the result of trading off or not considering some aspect of
experimental validity to meet the objectives of high external validity. Given the lack of
statistical support for the hypotheses in the current investigation, it was necessary to
examine these validity issues to insure that they were not a factor in the results.
One possible threat to validity was considered to be “statistical conclusion
validity,” which is concerned with the degree to which the investigation is sensitive
enough to permit reasonable statements about covariation, cause and effect, and the
strength of covariation. The authors cite several major threats to statistical conclusion
validity that must be considered. Arguably the most common experimental errors made
with respect to these threats are having low statistical power, violating the assumptions of
the statistical tests, and error rate problems. However, a power analysis was conducted
prior to this investigation indicating an 83% chance of detecting a medium effect size
(0.65) given the levels of variability demonstrated in similar studies and a with a planned
sample size of 60 participants. The largest effect size demonstrated in the current
investigation (0.36) indicated slightly fewer correct responses (0.36) in the ‘combined
feedback” conditions than in the no feedback condition (19.1 versus 20.5). The result of
a post-hoc power analysis of these data indicates that running approximately 3 times as
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many participants would not significantly support the hypothesis that participants
receiving combined feedback would provide more correct responses.
A second potential threat to statistical conclusion validity cited by Cook et al.
(1986) relates to violation of the assumptions to statistical tests. The current investigation
relied on analyses of variance using mean scores. Tests for normality and homogeneity
of variance conducted in the data analysis revealed no violations to these assumptions.
Moreover, the experimental design was such that observations were independent of one
another. These factors lend confidence that the investigation was valid with respect to its
statistical conclusions. Further, analysis of variance is a rather robust statistical test and
would very likely have been able to account for any minor variations. Finally, careful
attention was paid to insuring that there were no differences between participants on
relevant demographics and, other than the experimental manipulations, in the way that
each participant was run during data collection.
Construct validity is concerned with confounding variables and that variables
have the potential to be construed in terms of more than one construct. Given the
complexity of the task and constructs there was some danger that threats to construct
validity may have manifest themselves in this investigation. However, Cook et al. (1986)
recommend several countermeasures against threats to validity, which include thinking
through the definitions of the constructs, differentiating between constructs, deciding
which measures can be used to index these constructs, and developing multiple measures
of the constructs, where possible. Much of the initial focus of the current investigation
was on operationally defining the constructs of detection, diagnosis, prognosis, and
compensation, determining their boundaries, and developing measures to index each of
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these constructs. However, while there was careful planning, like most constructs in the
behavioral sciences, there was still some room for subjective interpretation on the part of
the investigator. Whether this interpretation was accurate, the boundaries were well
defined, and the measures were adequate indices of the constructs always has some room
for debate. Future research should focus on further refining the definitions,. constructs,
and measures involved in military fault management tasks.
The final area of potential threat to the validity of the investigation was internal
validity, which is concerned with whether or not two or more variables are causally
related. There are a number of threats, which fall under this category, many of which can
be minimized through randomization and control procedures to insure that there are no
systematic differences between participants and conditions across the investigation. It is
unlikely that the current investigation fell prey to major threats to internal validity for
several reasons. First, randomization was utilized and no major difference between
relevant participant attributes was identified. Second, the investigation took place over a
short period of time and within a laboratory setting, which did not change over the course
of the data collection. Third, much of the training consisted of ‘canned’ presentations
and the interaction between the participants and investigators was carefully scripted
during the data collection. Further, even the format of participant responses was
formatted according to report templates. These control mechanisms left little room for
participants to have systematically different experiences across groups.
Clearly, no study exists without potential threats to validity. The current study is
no exception. However, the preceding examination of these potential threats yielded no
major areas of concern. Multiple steps were taken to insure that, while there was an
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emphasis on the external validity of the study, statistical conclusion, construct, and
internal validity were all considered to be critical factors as well. This lends credence to
the interpretation that the lack of statistical support for the hypotheses in this
investigation was not due to issues of experimental validity. Rather, the more likely
culprit lies in the differences between process control and military fault management
decision-making tasks in terms of ambiguity and target goal states. Future investigations
should focus on refining of the Rasmussen (1986) model within the domain of military
fault management decision support, as well as other domains, through a better
understanding of how these two factors, ambiguity and goal states, may impact the
predictions of the models.
The following section will describe several interesting findings from the current
investigation that may be utilized as ‘lessons learned’ for future research in this area.

Future Research Considerations

As discussed in the previous sections, none of the major hypotheses of this
investigation were directly supported by statistical analysis of the dependent measures
determined a priori. However, while not specifically hypothesized, two interesting results
did arise iin the data analyses. First, participants receiving any feedback at all were able
to provide significantly more correct rationales for why a particular gun fault represented
a problem to the successful to the gun mount. This result may suggest that additional
information provided over and above an identification of the problem may assist
operators in at the least understanding whether that problem is in reality a problem or
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whether it is just noise. Further research in this area should consider focusing on the
cues that operators use to develop a correct diagnostic rationale and how those can be
instantiated in feedback from a decision support tool.
A second interesting finding from this study was that operators who received both
logic trace and mission impact feedback made fewer errors of commission than those
receiving only logic trace, only mission impact, or no feedback at all. It is likely that
both forms of feedback taken together provided the participants with a better
understanding of the specific type of task that the transducer damage problem
represented. Of all of the gun casualties in this investigation, transducer damage was
perhaps the most complex to resolve because there were multiple options the operators
could take. Further, failure to respond correctly had very clear consequences. Operators
could continue firing with decreased accuracy only at the peril of troops or friendly forces
in the area. Finally, this particular gun casualty had very clear consequences in terms of
cost. In the training, it was stressed that ERGM was an expensive solution to decreased
accuracy and should only be used as a last resort. Since many of the errors of
commission directly related to this particular gun casualty, future study should be
directed toward gaining a better understanding how the variables of task complexity,
perceived complexity, and decision support feedback may interact to produce errors of
commission.
In addition to the factors examined in the previous section, several other factors
may have contributed to the lack of statistical support for the four primary hypotheses
offered in this investigation. First, while much effort was devoted to developing a rich
scenario for hypothesis testing, the tasks of the participants themselves were not as robust
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as might be imagined from the complexity of the scenario described previously. For
most gun casualties, there were only a limited number of actions that were appropriate for
the operator to take. The training that was provided to the participants covered each of
the types of gun casualties, their causes, potential impacts on the mission, and the correct
responses in great detail. Consequently, by the time participants were seated before the
final scenario, they were very well trained in all aspects of the experimental task, where
to obtain information, and how to report it. The relatively high scores across groups may
be more testimony to the training the participants received and perhaps less related to the
feedback that the Naval Surface Fire Support Assistant provided.
Second, as is the case in most investigations that seek to simulate some form of
complex military decision-making task, there were a number of motivational factors that
were missing from this investigation. In the Naval gunfire support domain, there are very
real consequences to making mistakes. Actual gun casualties have consequences that
cannot be adequately simulated in a laboratory environment. These include not just the
potential loss of life but damage to ones career and reputation as well. Consequently, the
participants in this investigation were highly likely to have had much less concern over
the consequences of an erroneous action than would be seen in the actual domain. This
interpretation is partially supported by the trainee reaction questionnaire, which showed
few strong feelings about the elements of the investigation. If participants had felt high
workload, uncertainty, or confusion, it would be expected that they would have provided
data on the trainee reaction questionnaire to support their feelings. While this fact does
not completely explain the lack of support for the hypotheses, it is one factor that
probably contributed to participant performance. If possible, future studies of this type
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should recruit from actual gun commanders in the fleet, who would have a better idea of
the risks and would have more extensive training in the subtleties and complexities of the
task as well. This would also allow for the development of a more realistic and robust
scenario to challenge highly trained participants in a more externally valid environment.
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CONCLUSIONS

This study was performed to investigate the potential of tailoring decision support
feedback to support the diagnostic, prognostic, and compensatory stages of fault
management. While the strategies for feedback chosen appeared to have little effect on
the prescribed outcome variables in this investigation, it is possible that Rasmussen’s
(1986) model, which was based in process control research may be in need of refinement
to be of utility in a military fault management domain, in which variables and target
outcomes are often more ambiguous. In addition, the results of this investigation suggest
that several other factors may have been likely to account for some of the impact of
decision support feedback in fault management. The results of this investigation do
provide some clues to which of those factors may relate to the effectiveness of decision
support feedback. Task complexity, motivational factors, consequences of failure,
training, and the format of feedback clearly have some impact on decision-making and
error in these situations. All of these factors have been cited as potential causal factors in
poor performance on real-world fault management situations. The current study
represents an initial investigation into using a fault management decision-making model
to guide the development of decision support feedback in this domain. Future studies
will seek to further understand the interaction of the above factors in fault management.
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APPENDIX A: INFORMED VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE
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INFORMED VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE
1. I am being asked to voluntarily participate in a
research study titled, AN INVESTIGATION INTO PROVIDING
FEEDBACK TO USERS OF DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR FAULT
MANAGEMENT.
I will be asked to perform training on the
use of the Naval Surface Fire Support Assistant, a
computerized decision support tool for Naval Gun
Commanders. This training will consist of watching several
videotapes and slide shows as well as performing several
practice scenarios with experimenter assistance on standard
computers. Upon the completion of this training, I will be
asked to perform a war game scenario in which I will make
decisions about the mission with the aid of this tool. My
duties during this scenario will be to solve gun problems
and report events to an experimenter.
2.
I understand that the investigators believe that the
risks or discomforts to me are as follows:
There are no foreseeable risks to participating in this
study over those that might be expected in the training of
any computer software and playing a typical computer game.
3.
The benefits that I may expect from my participation
in this study are minimal. I understand that I will receive
monetary compensation and/or course extra credit for my
participation as well as the knowledge that participation
in this study will aid efforts to improve the performance,
safety, and/or the effectiveness of US Navy. I may have a
copy of any publications resulting from the current study
if I so desire.
4. My confidentiality during the study will be ensured by
assigning me a coded identification number. My name will
not
be
directly
associated
with
any
data.
The
confidentiality
of
the
information
related
to
my
participation
in
this
research
will
be
ensured
by
maintaining records only coded by identification numbers.
Video and photographic images of me will not be published
or displayed without my specific written permission.

60

5.

If I have questions about this study I should contact
the following individuals:

James Pharmer, (Principle Investigator)
Code 4961
Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division (NAWCTSD)
12350 Research Parkway,
Orlando, FL 32826-3275
(407)380-4771
PharmerJA@navair.navy.mil

Trish Hamburger, (Project Manager)
Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division
17320 Dahlgren Road
Dahlgren , VA 22448-5100
(540)653-1119
phambur@nswc.navy.mil

Dr. Jerry Laabs(Acting Chair, Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects)
Code 4.9T
Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division (NAWCTSD)
12350 Research Parkway,
Orlando, FL 32826-3275
(407) 380-4282
LaabsGJ@navair.navy.mil

6.

My participation in this study is completely voluntary.

7. My participation in this study may be stopped by the
investigator at any time without my consent if it is
believed the decision is in my best interest. There will be
no penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise
entitled at the time my participation is stopped.
8. No out of pocket costs to me may result from my
voluntary participation in this study.
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9.
If I decide to withdraw from further participation in
this study, there will be no penalties. To ensure my safe
and orderly withdrawal from the study, I will inform the
Principal Investigator, James A. Pharmer.
10.
Official government agencies may have a need to
inspect the research records from this study, including
mine, in order to fulfill their responsibilities.
11.
I have received a statement informing me about the
provisions of the Privacy Act (attached).
12. I have been informed that the CPHS Coordinator is
responsible for storage of research records related to my
participation in this study. My consent form will be
stored under lock and key in compliance with NAWCTSD
Policies and Procedures for the Protection of Human
Subjects.
13. I have been given an opportunity to ask questions
about this study and its related procedures and risks, as
well as any of the other information contained in this
consent form. All my questions have been answered to my
satisfaction. I understand what has been explained in this
consent form about my participation in this study. I do not
need any further information to make a decision whether or
not to volunteer as a participant in this study. By my
signature below, I give my voluntary informed consent to
participate in the research as it has been explained to me,
and I acknowledge receipt of a copy of this form for my own
personal records.
Volunteer:
Name (Please
Print):________________________________________________
Signature:_________________________________________________
SSN: ____________________________
Date: ___________________________

Investigator:
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Name: ______________________________________
Signature: ___________________________________
Date:_______________________________________
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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
1. Authority. 5 U.S.C. 301
2. Purpose. Performance speed and accuracy information will
be collected in an experimental research project titled,
“AN INVESTIGATION INTO PROVIDING FEEDBACK TO USERS OF
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR FAULT MANAGEMENT” to
investigate the effectiveness of different feedback
training techniques on performance.

3. Routine Uses. The data collected will be used for
analyses and reports by the Departments of the Navy and
Defense, other U.S. Government agencies, and authorized
government contractors. Additional use of the information
may be granted to non-Government agencies or individuals
by the Navy Surgeon General following the provisions of
the
Freedom
of Information
Act
or
contracts
and
agreements. I voluntarily agree to its disclosure to the
agencies or individuals identified above, and I have been
informed that failure to agree to this disclosure may
make the research less useful.
4. Voluntary
Disclosure.
Provision
of
information
is
voluntary. Failure to provide the requested information
may result in failure to be accepted as a research
volunteer in an experiment, or removal from the program.
Attached: Informed Voluntary Consent To Participate
this experiment, signed by the research volunteer.
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APPENDIX C: SCENARIO TARGETS AND ATTRIBUTES
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Targets and Attributes in Performance Scenario

Time sent Target# Target Type
10
10
10
25
25
25
40
530
530
530
530
530
530
1250
1250
1500
1500
1900
1900
2100
2100
2350
2350
2550
2550
2850
2850
3050
3050

1 COMMAND_POST
2 ARMOR
3 BRIDGE
4 AIRFIELD
5 GUNS
6 TROOPS
7 ARMOR
8 COMMAND_POST
9 COMMAND_POST
10 GUNS
11 AIRFIELD
12 TROOPS
13 GUNS
14 AIRFIELD
15 COMMAND_POST
16 TROOPS
17 AIRFIELD
18 GUNS
19 TROOPS
20 COMMAND_POST
21 BRIDGE
22 ARMOR
23 TROOPS
24 GUNS
25 AIRFIELD
26 GUNS
27 AIRFIELD
28 COMMAND_POST
29 ARMOR

Sensitivity
#ROUNDS
START TIME
AMMO TYPE
START TIME
START TIME
AMMO TYPE
AMMO TYPE
START TIME
#ROUNDS
ACCURACY
ACCURACY
START TIME
START TIME
START TIME
END TIME
ACCURACY
ACCURACY
ACCURACY
ACCURACY
#ROUNDS
START TIME
START TIME
START TIME
ACCURACY
#ROUNDS
START TIME
START TIME
ACCURACY
ACCURACY
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Round
Type
HE
HE
ERGM
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE
HE

# of Rounds Priority
5
15
5
5
5
5
5
10
5
5
5
10
5
5
5
5
5
5
10
10
5
5
10
10
5
10
5
10
5

6
8
9
9
9
9
1
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
6
8
9
2
9
9
9
9
9
9

APPENDIX D: FAULT MANAGEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
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1. What is the gun commander’s mission?

A. To support an air assault by destroying or neutralizing
enemy defenses
B. To support an amphibious assault by destroying or
neutralizing enemy defenses
C. To provide appropriate guidance and feedback to Naval
officers
D. To report friendly submarine contacts to Marine
Amphibious Units.
E. None of the above

2. What is the Combat Information Center (CIC)?

A. A land-based information center that provides assistance
to the gun commander
B. A satellite network system that the gun commander is able
to access when emergency information is required
C. A space where the ships weapons and sensors are employed
D. A Naval communications center, located in Norfork, VA
E. None of the above

3. Who will you (the gun commander) make reports to?

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

4.

The Tactical Action Officer (TAO)
The Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF)
The Combat Information Center (CIC)
The Air Spotter (AS)
None of the above

T

or

F
Target scheduling occurs in the Combat
Information Center (CIC)?

5. The target position is expressed in:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Kilometers
Meters
Miles
Grid Coordinates
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E. None of the Above

6. Who assigns responsibilities and schedules the amphibious
assault?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

The Tactical Action Officer (TAO)
The Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF)
The Commanding Naval Officer (CNO)
The Air Spotter (AS)
None of the above

7. Which of the following does not describe a spotter?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Gives CIC corrections to the aim point
Provides feedback as to mission success
Is able to see the target
May provide information on movement of enemy forces
None of the above

8. The battle space should be thought of as a 3-dimensional
box with a ceiling of
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

24,000 feet
5,000 feet
16,000 feet
18,000 feet
None of the above

9. The presence of friendly forces near a target will make
that target
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Useless
Very low priority
Very high priority
Accuracy sensitive
None of the above

10. On Jane’s Fleet Command, hostile contacts are
displayed in the color
A. Blue
B. Yellow
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C. White
D. Black
E. None of the above

11.

T

or

F

Unknown contacts are displayed in the
color blue.

12.

A “speedleader” gives what?

A. A quick indication of the course only of each contact
B. A quick indication of the speed only of each contact
C. A quick indication of the course and speed of each
contact
D. An elaborate explanation of the course only of each
contact
E. None of the above
13. In Jane’s Fleet Command, targets are identified with
the symbol
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

T
X
o
F
None of the above

14. For the NSFSA and for Jane’s Fleet Command, prehook
information can be obtained by
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Right clicking on the contact
Pressing the F4 key
Pressing the Enter key
Placing the mouse over the contact
None of the above

15. The gun commander is able to see text for messages
received by
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Right clicking on the contact
Pressing the F4 key
Pressing the Enter key
Placing the mouse over the contact
None of the above
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16.

T

or

F

The NSFSA is able to incorporate
information gained through Jane’s Fleet
Command when making recommendations
about courses of action.

17. In NSFSA, a target that is displayed as partially red
and partially green
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Has not yet been fired on
Is in progress
Is very high priority
Has already been fired on
None of the above

A target with a priority of 1
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Is very low priority
Is neither high nor low priority
Is very high priority
Has already been fired on
None of the above

When firing, the gun commander should use ______ rounds
only when there is no alternative.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

High Explosive (HE)
Smoke
Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM)
Illumination
None of the above

T
or
F Transducers are sensors in the gun mount
that help improve firing
accuracy.

In which order are courses of action (COAs) presented?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Alphabetical order
Least appropriate first
Most appropriate first
Chronological order
None of the above
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What does a green check mark next to a COA mean?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

That
That
That
That
None

COA is high priority
COA is low priority
COA is not recommended at this time
COA has been chosen
of the above

Hydraulic Seal Hot is only a problem when
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

The gun commander is using high explosive rounds
There is a green check mark next to a COA
The gun mount also has a hydraulic seal leaking
The other gun mount is incapacitated
None of the above

T
or
F
The recoil suppressor’s primary purpose is
to ensure the accuracy of ERGM rounds.

What does it mean if a gun problem is presented, but no
COA’s are recommended?
A. A gun problem exists, but there is not a target scheduled
for this gun
B. The NSFSA does not know how to prioritize the COA’s
C. A gun problem exists making it impossible for the gun
commander to follow the appropriate COA
D. A gun problem exists and the other gun mount is
incapacitated
E. None of the above

T
or
F
You should not make a “Firing Complete
Report” to the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) unless you
have already decided on a recommendation.
You are firing on a low priority, accuracy sensitive target
with MT51. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun problem
“Transducer damaged MT51.” This is your only gun problem.
MT52 is not currently firing on a target and is not
scheduled to fire on a target for 5 minutes.
How does “transducer damaged” affect the gun?
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A.Causes the gun to get too hot
B.Degrades the accuracy of the gun
C. Slows the firing rate of the gun
D. Renders the gun inoperable
E. None of the above
How might this problem impact the mission?
A. May cause a hydraulic seal leak
B. May cause start time sensitive targets to begin being
fired on too late
C. May require changes in scheduling of or rounds used for
accuracy sensitive firing
D. May cause the hydraulic seal to get hot
E. None of the above

In this situation, what would you do?
A. Continue firing on the target, while being aware of
other system conditions
B. Cancel the target
C. Switch to ERGM rounds
D. Reallocate the target to MT52
E. None of the above
You are firing on a high priority, time sensitive target
with MT51. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun problem “Recoil
Damaged MT51.” This is your only gun problem. MT52 is
currently firing on another high priority, time sensitive
target.
How does “Recoil Damaged” affect the gun?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Causes the gun to get too hot
Degrades the accuracy of the gun
Slows the firing rate of the gun
Continued firing renders the gun inoperable
None of the above

How might this problem impact the mission?
A. The mission schedule will likely be altered
B. This will likely have no effect on the mission
C. I will likely run low on ERGM rounds
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D. I will likely run low on high explosive (HE) rounds
E. None of the above

In this situation, what would you do?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Continue to fire MT51
Reallocate the target to MT52
Cancel the target allocated to MT51
Cancel the mission
None of the above

You are firing on a low priority, time sensitive target
(Target 4) with MT51. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun
problem “Ammo Low MT51.” This is your only gun problem.
MT51 is scheduled to begin firing on a high priority, time
sensitive target (Target 6) immediately following Target
four’s completion. MT52 is currently firing on a time
sensitive, high priority target (Target 5) and has another
time sensitive, high priority target (Target 7) scheduled
immediately following completion.
How does “Ammo Low” affect the gun?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Causes the gun to get too hot
Degrades the accuracy of the gun
Slows the firing rate of the gun
Continued firing renders the gun inoperable
None of the above

How might this impact the mission?
A. May cause an inability to fire on accuracy sensitive
targets
B. May have to cancel some target(s) or fall behind
schedule
C. Will likely have to cancel mission
D. Will likely have no impact on the mission
E. None of the above

In this situation, what would you do?
A. Reallocate Target 4 to MT52
B. Continue firing on Target 4 as scheduled
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C. Reallocate MT51 to help with Target 5
D. Cancel Target 4
E. None of the above

You are firing on a high priority, accuracy and time
sensitive target with MT52. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun
problem “Transducer damaged MT52.” This is your only gun
problem. MT51 is also currently firing on a high priority,
accuracy and time sensitive target.
How might this problem impact the mission?
A. May cause a hydraulic seal leak
B. May cause start time sensitive targets to begin being
fired on too late
C. May alter schedule or ammunition used for accuracy
sensitive firing
D. May cause the hydraulic seal to get hot
E. None of the above

In this situation, what would you do?
A. Continue firing on the target, while being aware of
other system conditions
B. Cancel the target
C. Switch to ERGM rounds
D. Reallocate the target to MT51
E. None of the above

You are firing on a low priority time sensitive target with
MT52 and on a high priority, accuracy sensitive target with
MT51. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun problem, “Hydraulic
Seal Hot MT52.” This is your only gun problem. The next
scheduled target for MT52 is in 2 min 30 sec. The next
scheduled target for MT51 is in 4 min.
How does the problem, “Hydraulic Seal Hot,” affect the gun?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

This
This
This
This
None

degrades the accuracy of the gun
slows the rate of fire of the gun
makes a hydraulic seal leak more likely
renders the gun inoperable
of the above
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How might this impact the mission?
A. May prevent the time sensitive target allocated to MT52
from being completed
B. May prevent the accuracy sensitive target allocated to
MT51 from being completed
C. No immediate impact, but will have to watch for a
hydraulic seal leak
D. May prevent firing of the next scheduled target for MT51
E. None of the above

In this situation, what would you do?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Continue to fire on the target with MT52
Cancel the mission
Cancel the target allocated to MT52
Switch MT52 to ERGM rounds
None of the above

You are firing on a low priority, time sensitive target
with MT51. The next scheduled target for MT51 is high
priority. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun problem,
“Hydraulic Seal Leak MT51.” There are no targets currently
scheduled to MT52.
How does “Hydraulic Seal Leak” affect the gun?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Causes the gun to get too hot
Degrades the accuracy of the gun
Slows the firing rate of the gun
Causes the gun to require ERGM rounds
None of the above

How might this impact the mission?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

The mission schedule will likely be altered
This will likely have no effect on the mission
I will likely run low on ERGM rounds
I will likely run low on high explosive (HE) rounds
None of the above

In this situation, what would you do?
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A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Continue to fire MT51
Reallocate the target to MT52
Cancel the target allocated to MT51
Switch to ERGM rounds
None of the above

You are firing on a low priority, time sensitive target
(Target 9) with MT52. This is the last scheduled target for
MT52. The NSFSA alerts you to the gun problem “Recoil
Damaged MT52.” This is your only gun problem. MT51 is
currently firing on another high priority, time sensitive
target.
How might this problem impact the mission?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

It may not be possible to complete Target 9
This may interfere with other targets allocated to MT52
MT52 may need to be reallocated to another target
I will likely run low on ammo
None of the above

In this situation, what would you do?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Reallocate Target 9 to MT51
Cancel Target 9
Switch to ERGM rounds
Continue firing on Target 9 as scheduled
None of the above

You are firing on a high priority, time sensitive target
(Target 5) with MT51 and on a high priority, time sensitive
target (Target 6) for MT52. On Jane’s Fleet Command, you
see that friendly troops have just moved close to Target 6.
The NSFSA alerts you to the following problems: “Ammo Low
MT51,” and “Transducer Damaged MT52.” You have no other
gun problems.
How might these problems affect the mission?
A. It is likely
the mission
B. It is likely
C. It is likely
D. It is likely

that these problems will have no impact on
that a hydraulic seal will get hot
that a hydraulic seal will get hot and leak
that both guns will become inoperable
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E. None of the above

In this situation, what would you do?
A. Cancel Target 5 and switch to ERGM rounds for MT52
B. Switch to ERGM rounds for MT52 and continue firing MT51
on Target 5
C. Reallocate MT52 to Target 5 and cancel Target 6
D. Reallocate MT51 to Target 6 and MT52 to Target 5
None of the above

You are firing on a high priority target (Target 3) with
MT52. This target is not time sensitive. The NSFSA alerts
you to the following gun problems: “Hydraulic Seal Hot
MT52,” and “Hydraulic Seal Leak MT52.” There are no other
gun problems. MT51 is currently firing on a high priority,
time sensitive target, but has no targets scheduled after
its completion.
How might these problems affect the mission?
A. It is likely that these problems will have no impact on
the mission
B. It is likely that it will not be possible to fire on an
accuracy sensitive target
C. It is likely that MT52 will run out of ERGM rounds
D. It is likely that both guns will become inoperable
E. None of the above

In this situation, what would you do?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Reallocate Target 3 to MT51
Continue firing on Target 3 with MT52
Cancel Target 3
Reallocate Target 3 to MT51 and Target 4 to MT52
None of the above

18.

T

or

19.

T

or

F

F

All gun problems should be reported to the
TAO
A hydraulic seal that gets hot very early
in a mission is still not likely to impact
the mission
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20.

T

T

or

or

F

F

Transducer damage degrades the accuracy of a
gun

Recoil damage is not a serious gun problems

21.

T

or

F

A leaking hydraulic seal degrades the
accuracy of the gun

22.

T

or

F

Unless it leads to other problems, a hot
hydraulic seal has no affect on the gun

T or F As ammo becomes low, the maximum firing rate of
the gun slows
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APPENDIX E: NSFSA KNOWLEDGE PRE-TEST
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NSFSA PRETEST RUN # ______________

THERE MAY BE MORE THAN ONE CORRECT ANSWER.

1. What can you assume with the gun problem Transducer Damaged?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired.
This gun is no longer accurate enough to shoot an accuracy sensitive target.
This gun can be fired unless it also has a hydraulic seal hot.
Continuing to fire this gun mount could cause serious gun damage.
None of the above.

2. What can you assume with the gun problem Hydraulic Seal Leaking?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired.
This gun is no longer accurate enough to shoot an accuracy sensitive target.
This gun can be fired unless it also has a recoil suppressor damaged.
Continuing to fire this gun mount could cause serious gun damage.
None of the above.

3. What can you assume with the gun problem Ammo Low?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired.
This gun is no longer accurate enough to shoot an accuracy sensitive target.
This gun can be fired unless it also has a hydraulic seal leaking.
Continuing to fire this gun mount could cause serious gun damage.
None of the above.

4. What can you assume with the gun problem Recoil Damage?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired.
This gun is no longer accurate enough to shoot an accuracy sensitive target.
This gun can be fired unless it also has a transducer damaged.
Continuing to fire this gun mount could cause serious gun damage.
None of the above.

5. What can you assume with the gun problem Hydraulic Seal Hot?
A. The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired.
82

B.
C.
D.
E.

This gun is no longer accurate enough to shoot an accuracy sensitive target.
This gun can be fired unless it also has a hydraulic seal leaking.
Continuing to fire this gun mount could cause serious gun damage.
None of the above.

6. How high can we expect projectiles to go in today’s gun shoot?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

33,000’
18,000’
16,500’
1,500’
12,000’

7. What is the advantage of using High Explosive (HE) projectiles?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

They make a bigger bang than ERGM.
There are lots of them onboard.
They cost less than some other rounds.
They are easier to shoot.
None of the above.

8. What is the advantage of using Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM)?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

They make a bigger bang than HE rounds.
There are lots of them onboard.
They cost less than some other rounds.
They are easier to shoot.
None of the above.

9. What can you assume with friendly forces in the area of a scheduled target?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

The next scheduled target for this gun cannot be fired.
The gun shooting this target can not have a Transducer Damaged problem.
Friendly forces will not be so close to the target that they will be in danger.
Regardless of the target category selected, the target is also accuracy sensitive.
None of the above.

10. When should situation reports be made to the TAO?
A. When you have a gun problem.
B. When contacts near the battle space first appear or become a threat to safety.
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C. When messages are received that may effect the gunfire mission.
D. When firing on scheduled targets is complete.
E. None of the above.
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APPENDIX F: PARTICIPANT REACTION QUESTIONNAIRE

85

Participant # ______

Condition ________

Training Questionnaire
Note: “Feedback” pertains to the information given by the NSFSA in support of the
recommended course of action (COA).
1. How well do you feel you performed the task?
1
Not well
at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
well

5

6

7
Very
satisfied

6

7
Extremely
well

2. How satisfied were you with the training experience?
1
Not at all
satisfied

2

3

4

3. How well did you feel you understood what you were doing?
1
Not well
at all

2

3

4

5

4. How much did the feedback provided by the NSFSA help you to perform the
scenario?
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
much

5. How confident are you in the ability of the NSFSA to recommend the most
appropriate course of action (COA)?
1
Not at all
confident

2

3

4
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5

6

7
Very
confident

6. How much did the feedback you were provided by NSFSA help you to make a
decision on which course of action to choose?
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
much

7. Overall, how much did the feedback provided by the NSFSA help you to perform the
scenario?
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
much

8. How well did the feedback help you to understand why each gun casualty was a
problem?
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
well

9. How well did the feedback help you to understand the impact of gun problems on the
mission?
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
well

10. How satisfied were you with the feedback given as to why each recommendation was
made?
1
Not at all
satisfied

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very
satisfied

11. Did the feedback given by the NSFSA help you to determine whether to accept the
recommendation?
Yes

No
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12. Overall, how easy was it to understand the feedback given by the NSFSA?
1
Very
difficult

2

3

4
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5

6

7
Very easy

APPENDIX G: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
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Participant # ______
Demographic Questionnaire
Age______

Gender _______

Describe your education:
Class:
Freshman
Graduate

Sophomore Junior

Senior

Major:_______________________
Highest Degree Held?
High School Diploma
Bachelors Degree

Associates Degree

Are you currently or have you ever been enrolled in the
military?
Yes

No

If, yes:
Which branch? _______________

Rank:_______________

Years of service: ______ Dates: ___________ to ____________
Billet:_____________________
Please provide any other relevant military details below.

Computer Experience
Circle the statement that best applies to you
What’s a
computer?

Never use
computers

Sometimes use
computers

Frequently use
computers

How often do you play video games?
Never

Rarely

Occasionally
90

Often

Very Often
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Please circle the computer applications that you use
Video games
Internet

Word Processing

E-mail

Spreadsheet

Programming Languages
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APPENDIX H: SURFACE AND AIR SITUATION REPORT TEMPLATE
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TAO, GUNS
I HAVE A _________(SURFACE OR AIR) _____CONTACT
TO THE ____(NORTH, SOUTH, SOUTHWEST, ETC.)____
HEADED TOWARD THE __(NORTH, SOUTH, SOUTHWEST, ETC.)__
SPEED ____________ KNOTS
ALTITUDE ________ FEET
MY RECOMMENDATION IS TO ____(MONITOR, ALTER COURSE, ETC.)___
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APPENDIX I: GUN CASUALTY REPORT TEMPLATE
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TAO, GUNS
I HAVE A ____(GUN CASUALTY )______ ON MOUNT ___(51 OR 52).
THIS __(IS/IS NOT)__ A PROBLEM FOR US NOW BECAUSE:________________.
I RECOMMEND ____(COA)_____ BECAUSE ______________________________.
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APPENDIX J: CODING SHEET FOR NSFSA
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Time
95
97
276
306
515
517
756
757
995
997
1235
1236
1475
1476
1715
1716
1955
1956
2195
2196
2437
2438
2676
2677
2915
2916
3155
3157

MT
MT51
MT52
MT52
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT52
MT51
MT52

Gun Casualty

Det

HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT
TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED
HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT
AMMO_LOW
RECOIL_DAMAGED
RECOIL_DAMAGED
HYDRAULIC_SEAL_LEAKING
AMMO_LOW
HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT
HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT
TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED
AMMO_LOW
TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED
HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT
AMMO_LOW
TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED
TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED
HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT
TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED
HYDRAULIC_SEAL_LEAKING
RECOIL_DAMAGED
TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED
HYDRAULIC_SEAL_LEAKING
HYDRAULIC_SEAL_HOT
TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED
AMMO_LOW
TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED
TRANSDUCER_DAMAGED
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Diag

Prog

Comp

REFERENCES

American Psychological Association (1992). Ethical principles of psychologists and code
of conduct. American Psychologist, 47, 1597-1611.

Card, S., Moran, T., & Newell, A. (1983). The Psychology of Human Computer
Interaction, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis
issues for field settings. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

Edlund, C. & Lewis, M. (1994). Comparing ecologically constrained and conventional
displays in control of a simple steam plant. Proceedings of the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society 38th Annual Meeting (pp.486-490). Santa Monica, CA: Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society.

Edwards, W. (1987). Decision making: In G. Salvendy (Ed.). Handbook of Human
Factors (pp. 1061-1104). New York: Wiley.

99

Endsley, M. R. (1996). Automation and situation awareness. In R. Parasuraman & M.
Mouloua (Eds.) Automation and Human Performance: Theory and Applications. pp.163181. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems.
Human Factors, 37(1). 32-64.

Kieras, D. E. & Bovair, S. (1984). The role of a mental model in learning to operate a
device. Cognitive Science, 8-255-273.

Kieras, D. (1992). Diagrammatic displays for engineered systems: Effects on human
performance in interacting with malfunctioning systems. International Journal of ManMachine Studies, 36, 861-895.

Klein, G. A. Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., & Zsambok, C.E. (Eds.)(1995). Decision
Making in Action: Models and Methods. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Klein, G. A.. ( 1995). A recognition-primed decision (RPD) model of rapid decision
making. In Klein, G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., & Zsambok, C.E. (Eds.). Decision
Making in Action: Models and Methods, pp. 138-147.. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Lee, J., & Moray, N. (1992). Trust, control strategies and allocation of function in
human-machine systems. Ergonomics, 35, 1243-1270.

100

Moray, N. (1997). Human factors in process control. In G. Salvendy (Ed.). Hanbook of
Human Factors and Ergonomics 2nd Edition (pp. 1944-1971), .New York: John Wiley &
Sons.

Mosier, K. L., & Skitka, L. J. (1996) Human decision makers and automated decision
aids: Made for each other? In R. Parasuraman & M. Mouloua (Eds.), Automation and
Human Performance: Theory and Applications. pp 201-220 Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.

Moore, P., and Corbridge, C., (1996). Designing mimic diagrams: Moving from art to
science. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 40th Annual
Meeting (pp. 328-332). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

Mouloua, M., & Koonce, J. M.(Eds.) (1997) Human-automation interaction: Research
and practice. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Muir, B. M. (1987). Trust between humans and machines, and the design of decision
aids. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 527-539.

Norman, D. A. (1990). The “problem” with automation: Inappropriate feedback and
interaction, not “overautomation”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of
London, B, 327.

101

Parasuraman, R., & Riley, V. (1997) Humans and automation: Use, misuse, disuse, and
abuse. Human Factors, 39(2), 230-253.

Rasmussen, J. (1983) Skills, rules and knowledge; Signals, signs, and symbols, and other
distinctions in human performance models. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-13(3).

Rasmussen, J. (1985). The role of hierarchical knowledge representation in decision
making and system management. . IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics,
Vol. SMC-15(2), pp. 234-243.

Rasmussen, J. (1986). Information processing and human-machine interaction: An
approach to cognitive engineering. New York: North-Holland.

Rogers, W. H., Schutte, P. C. , & Latorella, K. A., Fault management in aviation systems.
In R. Parasuraman & M. Mouloua (Eds.) Automation and Human Performance: Theory
and Applications. pp 281-318. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Rouse, W. B. (1978). Human problem solving performance in a fault diagnosis task.
IEEE Transaction on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, vol. SMC-8(4), pp. 258-271.

102

Sarter, N. B., Woods, D. D., & Billings, C. (1997). Automation surprises. In G. Salvendy
(Ed.), Handbook of human factors and ergonomics, 2nd Edition. (pp. 1926-1943). New
York: John Wiley & Sons

Sarter, N. B., & Woods, D. D. (1999). Team play with a powerful independent agent:
Operational experiences and automation surprises on the Airbus A-320. The Journal of
the Society for Human Performance in Extreme Environments 4(2), pp. 60-71.

Sarter, N. & Woods, D. D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational
experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation
Psychology, 2(4), 303-321.

Sarter, N. B. & Woods, D. D. (1995). “How in the world did we ever get into that
mode?” Mode error and awareness in supervisory control. Human Factors, 37, 5-19.

Shraagen, J. M. Discovering requirements for a naval damage control decision support
system. In C. E. Zsambok & G. Klein (eds.), Naturalistic Decision Making(pp. 227232)., Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum

Sheridan, T. B. (1970). On how often the supervisor should sample. IEEE Transactions
on Systems Science and Cybernetics, SSC-6, 140-145.

103

Vincente, K. (1991). Supporting knowledge-based behavior through ecological interface
design (Tech Report EPRL-91-1). Urbana-Champaign, IL: Engineering Psychology
Research Laboratory and Aviation Research Laboratory. University of Illinois.

Vincente, K., & Rasmussen, J. (1990). The ecology of human-machine systems II;
Mediating “direct perception” in complex work domains. Ecological Psychology, 2(3),
207-249.

Waterman. D. A. (1985). A guide to expert systems. Reading, MA. Addison-Wesley.

Weiner, E. (1989). Human factors of advanced technology (‘glass cockpit’) transport
aircraft (Technical Report # 117528). Moffett Field, CA; NASA Ames Research Center.

Weiner, E. L., & Curry, R. E. (1980). Flight deck automation: Promises and problems.
Ergonomics, 23(10), 995-1011.

Wickens, C. D. (1992). Engineering Psychology and Human Performance (2nd Ed.). New
York: Harper Collins

Woods, D. D., & Hanes, L. (1986). Human factors challenges in process control: The
case of nuclear power plants. In G. Salvendy (Ed.), Hanbook of Human Factors,
NewYork, John Wiley.

104

Woods, D. D. (1995). Towards a theoretical base for representation design in the
computer medium: Ecological perception and aiding in human cognition. In J. Flach, P.
Hancock, J. Caird, & K. Vincente (Eds.) An Ecological Approach to Human-machine
Systems I: A Global Perspective (pp. 157-188). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.

Woods, D. D. (1996). Decomposing automation: Apparent simplicity, real complexity. In
R. Parasuraman & M. Mouloua (Eds.) Automation and Human Performance: Theory and
Applications. pp 3-17. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Yoon, W. C., & Hammer, J. M. (1988). Aiding the operator in novel fault diagnosis.
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 18(4), 659-675.

105

